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ciple of “seeing-leads-to-knowing” constitutes one of
the processes involved in solving standard location-
change false belief tasks like the Sally-Ann (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). To succeed with this task,
children are required to understand that a character in a
story will assume an item to be in its original location
because she was absent when the object was moved to
another place. Broadly speaking, typically developing
children of around 4 years and older have been found
to succeed on false belief tasks of this kind. Children
with autism, however, have usually been found to per-
form worse on false belief tasks than do language- and
mental age–matched control subjects (e.g., Baron-
Cohen, 1989; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Reed & Peter-
son, 1990).
Recently, there has been some concern within the
literature that a continued focus on understanding of
false belief both in autism and in typical development
may persist at the expense of research into other as-
pects of children’s developing understanding about the
mind. In particular, a number of authors have begun to
question the assumption that a belief-desire psychology
of the kind assessed by false belief tasks constitutes the
INTRODUCTION
Autism has long been considered a disorder in
which understanding about the mind is specifically im-
paired (see Baron-Cohen, 2001, for a recent review).
Yet most investigations concerned with theory of mind
pathology in autism continue to focus on children’s un-
derstanding of epistemic states within only a narrow
range of contexts. Among the most common of these is
the “seeing-leads-to-knowing” paradigm, in which chil-
dren must apply the principle that visual access to an
object or event is a necessary condition for knowledge
concerning it (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Baron-Cohen &
Goodhart, 1994; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989).
For example, it seems likely that understanding the prin-
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Interpretive diversity is the term used by Carpendale and Chandler (1996) to refer to the fact
that two individuals exposed to precisely the same stimulus may interpret it in quite different,
but equally plausible, ways. An appreciation of interpretive diversity is said by Carpendale and
Chandler to represent a development in understanding that is qualitatively different from that
necessary to succeed on false belief tasks. A study is reported in which children with autism and
children with general delay were given a battery of tasks consisting of false belief tasks and
tasks designed to test for an understanding of interpretive diversity. Findings from the present
study offer limited support for Carpendale and Chandler’s claim that tasks which test for an un-
derstanding of interpretive diversity may be more difficult than false belief tasks. Between-group
differences in the consistency and quality of responses given by participants suggest that autis-
tic and delayed children may have differed somewhat in their approach to the tasks given.
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single most important feature of a mature theory of
mind. Among these authors are Carpendale and Chan-
dler (1996), who have debated Perner and Davies’
(1991) assertion that the ability to pass false belief tasks
at age 4 years demonstrates a fledgling understanding
of the mind as an active interpreter. An understanding
of this latter kind is reserved by Chandler & Boyes
(1982, p. 393) for “a subject-oriented or constructivis-
tic epistemology,” in which knowledge is no longer
seen to be reactive to objective events but rather the
product of “two-way” communication between the
mind and environment. Central to this idea is an un-
derstanding that two persons exposed to precisely the
same sensory stimulus can interpret this in quite dif-
ferent ways. For example, Carpendale and Chandler
found that, of their sample of 5- to 8-year-olds, only
the older children understood that it would be difficult
to predict which of two interpretations another child
would choose first of Jastrow’s (1900) ambiguous
duck /rabbit figure. One crucial difference between this
task, which is said by Carpendale and Chandler to test
for an understanding of interpretive diversity and those
which assess an understanding of false belief, is that
the former cannot be approached using the principle
of “seeing-leads-to-knowing.” Indeed, the fact that
most 5-year-olds failed and most 7- and 8-year-olds
passed their Duck /Rabbit task is said by Carpendale
and Chandler to indicate a development in children’s
understanding about minds that is qualitatively differ-
ent from that required to succeed on false belief tasks.
Unfortunately, however, Carpendale and Chandler do
not offer a detailed account of the processing capaci-
ties required for an understanding of interpretive di-
versity, a matter they presumably hope to explore in
further research.
To our knowledge, understanding of interpretive
diversity has not previously been examined in individ-
uals with autism or general cognitive delay. If sup-
ported by future empirical evidence, Carpendale and
Chandler’s distinction between two aspects of knowl-
edge about the mind is important not the least of which
because it offers an opportunity for investigating pos-
sible differences between the development of social
understanding in typically developing, delayed, and
autistic populations. Comparing performances by chil-
dren with autism and those with cognitive delay on
tasks that look at different “qualities” or “depths” of
social understanding is of particular interest because of
suspicions that at least some autistic children may pass
or fail false belief tasks for reasons quite different than
those of other children. When compared with typically
developing preschoolers, for example, children with
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autism may present with unusual profiles across false
belief tasks and tasks that test for an understanding of
nonmental representation, such as false photographs
(Zaitchik, 1990). To succeed on false photograph tasks,
children are required to demonstrate an understanding
that a photograph may misrepresent a current state of
affairs because the scene it depicted has changed since
the photograph was taken. Although 3- to 4 year-olds
tend to perform similarly across both false photograph
and false belief tasks, children with autism generally
perform better on the former than on the latter (e.g.,
Leekam & Perner, 1991; Peterson & Siegal, 1998). This
difference in performance profiles has been highlighted
by Leslie and colleagues (Leslie, 1994; Leslie & Roth,
1993; Roth & Leslie, 1998; Scholl & Leslie, 1999;
Surian & Leslie, 1999) in their modular account of
theory of mind difficulties associated with autism.
According to Leslie, false beliefs differ from false
photographs in that their understanding requires the
capacity to process metarepresentations, a function
carried out by an innate module called the “Theory of
Mind Mechanism” (ToMM). Success on a task like
the Sally-Ann (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), for exam-
ple, is said to require the appropriate specification of
“agent,” informational “content,” and “anchor” within a
metarepresentational “data structure”: Sally BELIEVES
(that) “it is in the basket” (is true of ) the marble (Roth
& Leslie, 1998, p. 4). Leslie and colleagues take poor
performance on false belief tasks by children with autism
to indicate a specific deficit in metarepresentational abil-
ity, assumed to arise from critical damage sustained to
ToMM. In contrast, the more general difficulties shown
by typically developing preschoolers across both false
belief and false photograph tasks are suggested to arise
from performance errors, brought about by immaturities
in an executive system—the selection processor.
Although Leslie and colleagues assume that less
able children with autism have an absolute impairment
in the capacity for metarepresentation, it has been sug-
gested that the disorder as a whole may more generally
be characterized by a delay in or continuum of metarep-
resentational ability (Happe, 1994). This idea seems
consistent with the findings that some autistic children
perform well on first-order false belief tasks but not on
higher-order tasks where the metarepresentational de-
mands are increased and that good performance on
first- and second-order tasks seems to correlate with
different levels of competence in other areas. For ex-
ample, Happe (1993) found first- and second-order false
belief performance to correlate with understanding of
metaphor and irony, respectively. Similarly, Hurlburt
et al. (1994) noticed a marked difference in the capac-
ities for introspection shown by individuals with
Asperger’s syndrome who performed at either floor,
first-order, or second-order levels of false belief. Un-
fortunately, however, neither of these studies provides
direct evidence for the role that metarepresentational
ability may have played in generating the results re-
ported. Indeed, in the case of Happe’s study, the cor-
relation between different types of figurative language
understanding and false belief task performance ex-
tended to a group of children with cognitive delay, a
finding that seems at odds with Leslie’s suggestion that
metarepresentational demands are not a factor in per-
formance by nonautistic individuals. In the case of
Hurlburt et al.’s investigation, too, the absence of any
comparison group makes it difficult to ascertain
whether the correlation between false belief task per-
formance and introspection was autism specific or
otherwise.
To obtain strong evidence for the hypothesis that
autism is characterized by a continuum of metarepre-
sentational ability, one would need to observe a dif-
ference in the performance profiles shown by children
with autism and comparison children across tasks that
make the same metarepresentational demands. It is our
contention that Carpendale and Chandler’s (1996) no-
tion of interpretive diversity may present just such a
test case. Importantly, there seems little reason to sup-
pose that an understanding of interpretive diversity
should make greater metarepresentational processing
demands than an understanding of false belief (both
require a first-order processing of attitudinal relations
toward a representation). As a result, a continuum of
damage to ToMM in autism should leave individual
children equally impaired or unimpaired on tasks of
both kinds. Furthermore, this profile across tasks should
differ from that demonstrated by a subgroup of chil-
dren with general cognitive delay, so long as Carpen-
dale and Chandler are correct in their argument for a
distinction between understandings of false belief and
interpretive diversity in instances where children are
following a typical path of development. As stated,
Carpendale and Chandler do not provide a detailed ac-
count of the processing demands that are unique to an
understanding of interpretive diversity. However, pro-
vided the critical factor is not an increase in the de-
mands on metarepresentational capacity, then comparison
across interpretive diversity and false belief tasks has the
potential to elicit a between-group difference in support
of the present hypothesis.
A challenge for the present authors was to assess
understanding of interpretive diversity in such a way
that procedural bias would not be a factor in separat-
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ing its measurement from performance on false belief
tasks. In an attempt to answer this concern, we de-
signed one of our interpretive diversity tasks to re-
semble, as closely as possible, Perner et al.’s (1989)
“Smarties” false belief task. In the Smarties task, chil-
dren are shown a familiar confectionery carton and
asked what they think is inside. Once children have
responded with “Smarties” (similar to M & Ms) or
“sweets,” the lid is removed from the carton to reveal
the true contents—a pencil. The lid is replaced, and
children are asked what another child, who has not
seen inside the carton, will think is inside. To succeed
on the Smarties task, children are required to under-
stand that a classmate who is not aware of information
to the contrary will be likely to assume that the carton
contains Smarties.
In the “Cow” task, used in the present study, chil-
dren were presented with a blurred picture that none of
them were able to interpret meaningfully. Children
were then given guided insight (see Procedure) into
an alternative and more meaningful interpretation of
this picture—that is, a different way of perceiving the
stimulus—that enabled them to recognize the picture
as a somewhat grainy portrait of a cow. Importantly, it
was intended that participants who had been “trained”
to interpret the stimulus in this way would henceforth
find it difficult to perceive the picture simply as a blur
in the way that they had done formerly. In this way,
children experienced a change in their mental repre-
sentation of a given stimulus similar to that undergone
in the Smarties task. However, although the Smarties
task concerned the possible misrepresentation of an ob-
jective (although concealed) item “out there,” the Cow
task referred only to subjective interpretation of am-
biguous stimuli. To succeed on the Cow task, then, chil-
dren were required to understand that what they saw
when they looked at a given picture might be radically
different from that seen by another child, who, nonethe-
less, was looking at precisely the same stimulus as
themselves. An appreciation that the mind actively in-
terprets a stimulus in this way is considered by Carpen-
dale and Chandler to be the definitive feature of an
understanding of interpretive diversity, distinguishing
it from the “seeing-leads-to-knowing” principle that is
sufficient for success on false belief tasks like the Smar-
ties. The question of whether this distinction is one that
might be found to characterize children’s understand-
ings at a particular stage in their development is an
empirical matter that we set out to explore.
Full procedures for the Cow and Smarties tasks,
as well as one further false belief task (Baron-Cohen
et al.’s [1985] Sally-Ann task, introduced earlier) and
two further interpretive diversity tasks are presented
here. In an effort to forestall any complaint that the
Cow task failed to adequately assess Carpendale and
Chandler’s notion of interpretive diversity understand-
ing, we included an adaptation of the Duck/Rabbit task
used by these authors. The third and final interpretive
diversity task was the “Giraffe” task designed by Tay-
lor (1988). Taylor proposes that the two-level scoring
system used in the Giraffe task is effective at catego-
rizing individuals according to their status either as
someone who works on the basis of “seeing-leads-to-
knowing” or as one who has a mature understanding of
interpretive diversity. If Carpendale and Chandler
(1996) are correct in arguing that success on false be-
lief tasks requires only an understanding that “seeing-
leads-to-knowing,” then one might expect children who
perform at the lower level of the Giraffe task to pass
on false belief but fail on interpretive diversity.
Overall, it was anticipated that analysis of perfor-
mances across the separate interpretive diversity tasks
would inform us as to whether these tasks constituted
a cohesive assessment, distinct from that offered by the
two false belief tasks. To summarize, it was hoped that
comparing the performance of children with autism
with that of a group of children with a general cogni-
tive delay on false belief tasks and on tests of inter-
pretive diversity understanding would be of interest on
two main counts: (1) we wanted to test Carpendale and
Chandler’s (1996) hypothesis that an understanding of
interpretive diversity is more difficult than an under-
standing of false belief tasks for children who follow
a typical path of development; the present study was the
first time that both of these two types of understanding
had been investigated in a single sample of children with
cognitive delay; and (2) we hoped to test the hypothe-
sis that children with autism perform on false belief
tasks as a function of their capacity for metarepresen-
tation (e.g., Roth & Leslie, 1998). This hypothesis
would be supported if individual children with autism
differed from those with cognitive delay by performing
similarly across all of the tasks presented.
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-eight children were tested on five tasks. Of
these, 34 had received a diagnosis of autism according
to standard criteria (DSM III-R [American Psychiatric
Association, 1987]; DSM IV [American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 1994]), and 34 were children with significant
cognitive delay drawn from schools for children with
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“moderate learning difficulties.” None of the children
in the cognitive delay group had received a diagnosis
of any Autism Spectrum Disorder or retardation-related
syndrome. All children were drawn from educational
establishments in Hertfordshire, Essex, and London,
United Kingdom.
The two groups were matched on a measure of ver-
bal comprehension. The Test for Reception of Gram-
mar (TROG; Bishop, 1989) was chosen in preference
to the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn
et al., 1982) as an assessment of children’s language
comprehension. Although not a measure of verbal in-
telligence, the TROG differs from the BPVS in that it
offers an evaluation of children’s understanding of
spoken sentences. Given the verbal nature of the tasks
presented, it was considered important to establish
that participants had adequate receptive language to
cope with the demands made by test questions. Only
children who scored an age equivalent of 4 years or
above were included in the study. Chronological age
(CA) and verbal comprehension age (VCA) character-
istics for the delayed and autism groups are presented
in Table I. Groups did not differ significantly for either
CA or VCA (CA: t  .58, df  66, NS; VCA: t  1.29,
df  66, NS).
Procedures
Participants were individually tested in a familiar
room within their school. Tasks were presented in ran-
dom order within the space of one 20- to 30-minute ses-
sion. Altogether, two false belief tasks and three tasks
that set out to assess understanding of interpretive di-
versity were included. The procedures for these tasks
are outlined here.
Table I. Sample Characteristics
Demographic Autism Delayed
variable (n  34) (n  34)
Chronological agea
Mean 11.11 11.6
SD 3.0 3.0
Range 6.4–16.2 7.0–16.1
Verbal comprehension age b
Mean 7.7 8.5
SD 2.7 2.5
Range 4.3–11.0 4.3–11.0
a All ages are given in years and months.
b Verbal comprehension ages are given in accordance with age-
equivalent scores on the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG;
Bishop, 1989).
False Belief Tasks
Two standard false belief tasks were administered;
Baron Cohen et al.’s (1985) Sally-Ann and Perner
et al.’s (1987) Smarties tasks. In the first of these, par-
ticipants are asked to watch a scene acted out with pup-
pets, one of whom is called Sally and the other is called
Ann. Sally has a basket, and Ann has a box. Sally places
a sweet inside her basket before leaving to go shop-
ping. When she is gone, naughty Ann takes the sweet
from Sally’s basket and places it in her own box. Now
Ann leaves to visit her friend. Sally enters and wants
her sweet. Participants are asked:
Test question: Where will Sally look for her sweet
first?
Reality question: Where is the sweet now?
Justification question: Why will Sally look in the
basket/box?
Memory question: Where was the sweet at the
beginning?
In the second task, children are shown a familiar
Smarties (M & Ms) carton and asked to guess the con-
tents. All participants replied appropriately with “Smar-
ties” or “sweets.” The lid is then removed from the
carton, and a felt-tip pen is produced from inside and
held up for participants to see. Children are asked to
identify this. Again, all children answered correctly.
The experimenter returns the pen to the Smarties car-
ton and replaces the lid, before asking the following:
Test question: I’m seeing (classmate’s name, e.g.,
James) after you. James hasn’t seen inside this
Smarties box before. If I show it to James all
closed up like this, just like I showed it to you
the first time, what will James say is inside?
Reality question: What’s really inside the box?
Memory question: When I first showed you the
box, before we opened it, what did you say was
inside?
Justification question: Why will James say that
there are Smarties inside?
Participants were required to answer all questions
correctly on each task to score a pass. To achieve an
overall pass for false belief understanding, children
were required to pass both the Sally-Ann and the Smar-
ties tasks.
Interpretive Diversity Tasks
Three tasks were used to look at children’s un-
derstanding that the mind actively interprets sensory
stimuli rather than passively receives it.
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Cow Task. The first of these tasks was designed to
resemble the Smarties task as closely as possible, dif-
fering in that the stimuli did not change throughout the
task, but rather children’s interpretation of it did change.
Children were introduced to the picture shown in Fig.
1a and asked “What can you see in this picture?” In the
10 seconds participants were given to study the picture,
none were able to identify its subject matter. A trans-
parency was then placed over the picture, on which was
drawn the outline shown in Fig. 1b. The outline was
arranged so that it appropriately matched the shading in
Fig. 1a. Children were again asked to identify the pic-
ture. All participants were able to recognize a domestic
animal, although some of them identified it as a pig or
a dog. The transparency was then removed, and children
Fig. 1. (a) Stimuli for Cow task (from Darley, Glucksberg, &
Kinchla, 1986, p. 117). (b) Transparency for Cow task (adapted from
Darley, Glucksberg, & Kinchla, 1986, p. 118).
(a)
(b)
were asked to point to the animal’s ears, eyes, and nose.
Where children were unable to comply, the transparency
was replaced over the picture and the process was re-
peated until all participants were able to show that they
could still see the animal when the transparency was ab-
sent. Next, children were asked the following:
Test question: I’m seeing (classmate’s name, e.g.,
James) after you. James hasn’t seen this picture
before. If I show this picture to James like this,
just like I showed it to you the first time, what
will James say is in the picture?
Reality question: What’s really in the picture?
Memory question: When I first showed you the
picture, before I put this drawing on top of it,
what did you say was in the picture?
Justification question: Why will James say there’s
nothing in the picture/the picture is just a blur?
Children needed to answer all of the questions cor-
rectly to pass the task.
The Cow task was specifically designed so that the
demands placed by its solution on children’s metarep-
resentational ability would be equivalent to those de-
scribed earlier for the Sally-Ann or Smarties task
according to the modular account of the theory of mind
deficit in autism (Roth & Leslie, 1998). Thus, the “data
structure” necessary for processing another’s different
interpretation of the Cow picture might be: James
THINKS (that) “it is a blur” (is true of ) the picture.
Giraffe Task. The second interpretive diversity
task was an adaptation of one devised by Taylor (1988),
who, like Carpendale and Chandler (1996), found that
only children of 6 years and above were consistently
successful. It was also similar to a task that Perner and
Davies (1991) claimed 4 year-olds could pass. In the
present task, children were shown the picture repro-
duced in Fig. 2a. All participants were able to identify
the animals depicted. Four pieces of card had been pre-
pared, with the same-sized square hole cut in each. Each
differed in the position of the hole, and consequently
the detail of the giraffe/elephant picture visible when
the card was placed over it. The details visible in each
case are shown in Fig. 2b. We excluded the “tiny edge”
restricted view used in Taylor’s study to limit the repet-
itive questioning that characterized the study as a whole.
Participants were asked to look at the picture carefully.
Their attention was directed to the fact that the giraffe
was sitting down, and they were informed that his name
was Gerald. Children were introduced to the task with
the information, “Look, if we cover up the picture like
this, then all that you can see is just this little bit of the
picture here. All the rest is hidden under the paper.”
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Fig. 2. (a) Stimuli for Giraffe task (taken from Taylor, 1988, p. 706).
(b) Restricted views for Giraffe Task (adapted from Taylor, 1988,
p. 707).
(a)
(b)
Children were asked to point to the part of the picture
that was visible. Then the experimenter said, “I’m see-
ing (classmate’s name, e.g., James) after you. James
hasn’t seen this picture before.” On presentation of each
view, children were reminded that their classmate had
not seen the picture before. Participants were then asked
the following two questions in randomized order:
Test questions: Will James know that there’s a gi-
raffe in the picture? Will James know that
there’s an elephant in the picture?
For restricted view 4 (identifiable part), two addi-
tional questions were asked:
Test questions: Will James know that the giraffe
is sitting down? Will James know that the gi-
raffe’s name is Gerald?
Following Taylor, responses to questions were clas-
sified as characteristic of a level 1 or level 2 under-
standing, in accordance with Table II. Taylor suggests
that level 1 responses to the Giraffe task can be achieved
by following the simple principle of “seeing-leads-to-
knowing.” Level 2 responses, on the other hand, require
an understanding that minds actively interpret the infor-
mation they receive. This is because level 2 responses
require an appropriate judgement concerning the likeli-
hood that another person can reach an accurate inter-
pretation of the picture based on incomplete information.
This contrasts with level 1 responses, which require only
an oversimplified appreciation that visual access of any
kind is sufficient for knowledge concerning a given item.
Scoring children on these two separate levels was of
interest because of Carpendale and Chandler’s (1996)
contention that use of the “seeing-leads-to-knowing”
principle (i.e., level 1 response) is sufficient to succeed
on false belief tasks. In the present study, children were
awarded a pass on the Giraffe task only where they per-
formed at a level 2 understanding.
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Duck /Rabbit Task. Last, we wanted to address
Carpendale’s and Chandler’s (1996) complaint that not
all tasks that claim to test for an understanding of the
mind as active interpreter avoid a more parsimonious
account of the level of understanding required to suc-
ceed. These authors suggest that a genuine test of in-
terpretive diversity understanding should demand an
appreciation that two persons presented with precisely
the same stimulus may interpret this in quite different
ways. In our adaptation of Carpendale and Chandler’s
task, children were presented with Jastrow’s (1900)
famous duck/rabbit picture and asked to identify what
they saw in the picture. According to the interpretation
chosen, the experimenter produced a transparency on
which the rest of the duck or rabbit’s body was out-
lined in ink. The experimenter placed the transparency
on top of the picture so that the outline could be seen
as a continuation of the duck’s or rabbit’s head shown
on paper. The experimenter said, “That’s right, it’s a
(duck/rabbit). There’s his (ears/beak), and that’s his
eye. But look, it could also be a . . . . . . . .” Here,
the experimenter produced a second transparency with
the alternative interpretation in outline. The trans-
parency was placed over the picture, and the experi-
menter paused to allow the participant to finish his
sentence appropriately. He then said, “So this picture
could be a (duck/rabbit), or it could be a (rabbit/duck).”
As each was identified, the corresponding transparency
was again placed over the picture. Children were then
asked the following:
Test question: I’m seeing (classmate’s name, e.g.,
James) after you. James hasn’t seen this picture
before. If I show this picture to James just like
this (both transparencies concealed), like I
showed it to you the first time, what do you think
James will say is in the picture? Will James say
that it’s a duck or a rabbit, or don’t you know
what James will say?
Table II. Level 1 and Level 2 Responses to Restricted View Task a
Level 1 responses Level 2 responses
Type of restricted view Elephant Giraffe Elephant Giraffe
Empty No No No No
One object (nondescript part) No Yes/nob No No
Two objects (nondescript parts) Yes Yes No No
One object (identifiable part) No Yes No Yes
a From Taylor, 1988, p. 708.
b There is no prediction for the answers to this question. Both yes and no answers could
be interpreted as consistent with level 1 perspective taking.
The order in which the alternatives (duck, rabbit,
don’t know) were presented was randomized. As the
three options were suggested, a card with each alter-
native written on it was produced and placed on the
table.
Justification question: Why don’t you know what
James will say? The justification question was
included to control for the possibility that chil-
dren were simply answering “don’t know” as a
default option.
A pass was awarded on the Duck/Rabbit task when
children showed an understanding that they could not
know which interpretation another child would choose.
To receive an overall pass mark for understanding of
interpretive diversity, children were required to suc-
ceed on all three tasks.
RESULTS
For each group, the percentage of correct answers
for each of the five tasks is given in Table III. Within
each group, the percentages of correct answers for the
two false belief tasks (i.e., Sally-Ann and Smarties)—
apart from one exception—were higher than those for
the three interpretive diversity tasks (i.e., Cow, Duck/
Rabbit, and Giraffe).
When comparing the proportion of correct answers
displayed in Table III between autistic and delayed chil-
dren, significant differences were found only for two
of the five tasks: the Smarties task [2(1): 3.85, p 
.05] and the Cow task [2(1): 8.47, p  .01]. Both dif-
ferences were in favor of the delayed group.
To also compare overall performance on false be-
lief and interpretive diversity by these two groups, a
simple pass/fail criterion was introduced for each kind
of task. Children were awarded an overall pass on each
task type only if they were successful on both tasks, in
the case of false belief, and on all three tasks, in the
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case of interpretive diversity. Consistent with findings
from previous studies, the group of children with autism
had a significantly [2(1): 6.01, p  .01] lower pro-
portion of overall pass scores on false belief (autistic
group, 44%) than did children with a general delay (de-
layed group, 73.5%). By contrast, no significant dif-
ference [2(1): 1.31, NS] was found between these
groups for the proportion of correct answers on all three
interpretive diversity tasks (autistic group, 29%; de-
layed group, 18%).
Furthermore, within-group comparisons regarding
the level of overall performance between the two types
of tasks revealed that both groups were better on false
belief tasks than on interpretive diversity tasks. The dif-
ference in percentage between the two types of tasks
was 14.7% for the autistic group (false belief, 44.1%;
interpretive diversity, 29.4%) and just failed to reach
significance (exact p value for McNemar’s test, .06).
For the delayed group, this difference amounted to
55.9% (false belief, 73.5%; interpretive diversity,
17.6%) and was highly significant (exact p value for
McNemar’s test, .001).
To investigate the degree of consistency of an-
swers to either type of task, Phi correlations among the
respective tasks were computed for each group sepa-
rately. Also, Phi correlations between different types
of tasks were computed to assess the amount of dis-
criminant validity (Table IV).
The correlation between the two false belief tasks
(Sally-Ann and Smarties) was moderate and significant
in the autism group but weak and nonsignificant in the
delayed group. All three correlations among the inter-
pretive diversity tasks were high in the autistic group,
but in the delayed group, only two moderate correlations
Table IV. Phi Corrections Among False Belief and Interpretive
Diversity Tasks
Smarties Cow Giraffe Duck/rabbit
Autism group
Sally-Ann .57c .51b .51b .51b
Smarties  .73c .73c .73c
Cow   .87c 1c
Giraffe    .87c
Delayed group
Sally-Ann .32 .01 .26 .05
Smarties  .65c .46b .46 b
Cow   .45b .45 b
Giraffe    .27
a p  .05.
b p  .01.
c p  .001.
Table III. Percentage of Correct Answers for Each Task
by Group of Children
Autism group (%) Delayed group (%)
Task (n  34) (n  34)
Sally-Ann 64.7 91.2
Smarties 47.1 76.5
Cow 32.4 67.6
Duck /Rabbit 32.4 41.2
Giraffe 32.4 41.2
were found, and the correlation between Giraffe and
Duck/Rabbit tasks was nonsignificant. These findings
suggest that there was a certain amount of disparity be-
tween the groups regarding the degree of convergent va-
lidity of the tasks representing false beliefs and
interpretive diversity respectively. Only the autistic
group showed a high degree of consistency in their an-
swers to both type of tasks.
Similar results were obtained for the across-type-
of-task correlations (Table IV). The three correlations
involving the Smarties task with the interpretive di-
versity tasks were significant in both groups, but those
for the Sally-Ann task were generally lower and in part
nonsignificant. Again, all six across-type-of-task cor-
relations were moderate to high and significant only in
the autistic group. Interestingly, no significant across-
type-of-task correlations were found for the Sally-Ann
task in the delayed group. Overall, the amount of dis-
criminant validity for the two sets of tasks appeared to
be rather limited.
A correlational analysis between performances on
false belief and interpretive diversity tasks was also of
interest with regard to the hypothesis that some chil-
dren might have succeeded on false belief tasks by ap-
plying a principle of “seeing-leads-to-knowing.” Taylor
(1988) suggested that children who perform at level 1
of her Giraffe task may be demonstrating an under-
standing of this kind, without a full understanding of
the mind as active interpreter. If this is the case, then
one might expect there to be a significant correlation
between level 1 performance on the Giraffe task and
success on false belief, accompanied by failure on in-
terpretive diversity. Contrary to this hypothesis, over-
all pass on false belief in attendance with overall fail
on interpretive diversity did not correlate significantly
with level 1 performance on the Giraffe task in either
the autism group (Phi  .19, NS) or the cognitive delay
group (Phi  .16, NS).
A weak and only marginally significant asso-
ciation between the two overall percentage rates for
the two kinds of tasks was found for the MLD group
(Phi  .31, p  .08), but a high and significant one
was found for the autistic group (Phi  .73, p  .001).
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Of the 15 autistic children who succeeded on the false
belief tasks, 67% also solved the interpretive diversity
tasks, but only 28% of the 25 delayed children who
were successful on the false belief tasks managed to
solve the interpretive diversity tasks. Hence, there was
a considerable difference between the two groups in
their conditional probabilities of also solving the in-
terpretive diversity tasks if the false belief had been
passed successfully.
Finally, the relation between verbal comprehen-
sion age and the probability of correctly solving all
tasks of either type was examined for the autistic and
delayed groups using logistic regression analysis. A
first model investigated the influence of verbal com-
prehension age and group membership on the proba-
bility of correctly solving both false belief tasks. This
model yielded a significant improvement over a base-
line model (likelihood ratio, 34.46, df  2, p  .001)
with both predictors reaching the level of significance
(p  .05). The adjusted odds ratio between group mem-
bership and success or failure on both false belief tasks
was 4.06 (95% CI, 1.06–15.62) in favor of the delayed
group, confirming that after controlling for possible dif-
ferences in verbal comprehension age, delayed children
were four times more likely to solve both false belief
tasks than were autistic children. The relation between
verbal comprehension age and the predicted probabil-
ities of success on both false belief tasks is shown in
Fig. 3 for both groups. As can be seen, delayed chil-
dren are expected to reach the 50% pass rate at around
6 years, whereas autistic children need 2 additional
years more to reach that rate.
Fig. 3. Expected probability of correctly solving both false belief
tasks for autistic and MLD children.
Table V. Results for the Cross-tabulation Analysis Between
the Overall Percentage Correct of False Belief and Interpretive
Diversity Tasks
Fisher’s exact test Phi correlation
Autistic group p  .001 .73 ( p  .001)
Delayed group p  .10 .31 (NS)
The same analysis was repeated for the probabil-
ity of passing all three interpretive diversity tasks.
As before, verbal comprehension age proved to be a
significant predictor (p  .001), but the adjusted odds
ratio representing the size of the difference between the
groups in obtaining a pass on all three tasks was not
significant (odds ratio, 3.3; 95% CI, .81–13.3). Thus,
the verbal comprehension age at which children were
expected to reach a 50% pass rate was fairly similar
for the two groups (autistic group, 8.7 years; delayed
group, 10 years); this time, however, at a slight ad-
vantage for the autistic group.
DISCUSSION
We set out to examine performances across five
theory of mind tasks by children with autism and chil-
dren with cognitive delay. The results provide tentative
support for Carpendale and Chandler’s (1996) asser-
tion that an understanding of false belief is develop-
mentally precedent to an understanding of interpretive
diversity. Consistent with this hypothesis, the group of
children with developmental delay in our sample per-
formed significantly better on an overall measure of
false belief understanding than on three tasks aimed at
assessing understanding of interpretive diversity. How-
ever, the weak or moderate nature of correlations found
between tasks in each of these categories suggests that
caution is needed before interpreting these results as
supportive of a general distinction between under-
standings of false belief and interpretive diversity. We
consider the possible implications of such inconsisten-
cies in performance by children with cognitive delay
further in the discussion.
As in many previous studies, the children with
autism in the present investigation performed signifi-
cantly worse on an overall measure of false belief un-
derstanding than did children with a general delay
matched for verbal comprehension age. Indeed, this dif-
ference between groups persisted even after variation in
verbal comprehension had been statistically controlled
for. This finding is of special interest because of the cur-
rent discussion concerning the relationship between lan-
guage and theory of mind competence in children with
autism (e.g., Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 1999). The
present study supports previous evidence for an associ-
ation between language abilities and performance on
false belief tasks, not only for children with autism but
also for children with cognitive delay (Frith, Happe, &
Siddons, 1994; Kazak et al., 1997; Yirmiya et al., 1996,
1998). However, as in a previous study by Happe
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(1995), the language competence at which we found
children with autism to achieve a 50% success rate on
false belief tasks was somewhat higher than that found
to characterize children in the comparison group (al-
though, in fact, the TROG age equivalent of 8 years
recorded in the present study was slightly lower than
the 9 years 2 months scored by children with autism on
Happe’s more comprehensive language assessment).
Taken together, these findings suggest that language
ability may have played an important role in false be-
lief task performance by children from both groups, and
especially by children with autism. At the same time,
however, it seems that this factor alone did not account
for the difference in success rates between the two
groups.
Interestingly, an equivalent difference in language
comprehension levels between autistic and delayed
children was not found to characterize successful over-
all performance on interpretive diversity tasks, despite
the fact that verbal comprehension was a significant
predictor of performance by children on this kind of
task. In passing, it should be noted that the compre-
hension level at which the group of children with delay
reached a 50% success rate on interpretive diversity
tasks was about 3 to 4 years higher than that suggested
by Carpendale and Chandler for typically developing
children. Needless to say, this discrepancy might sim-
ply have been a function of the difference between as-
sessments used by the present authors and Carpendale
and Chandler. Perhaps more important was the lack of
significant difference between the autism and compar-
ison groups’ performances on interpretive diversity
tasks when based on an overall pass/fail criterion. To
some extent, these findings seem supportive of Carpen-
dale and Chandler’s suggestion that these task types
differ in difficulty, at least with regard to our sample
of delayed children.
Interestingly, children in the autism group also
seemed to find interpretive diversity tasks somewhat
easier than false belief, albeit not to the same degree
as children in the delayed group. In fact, the results col-
lected for children with autism are somewhat confus-
ing in that despite the fact that false belief was found
to be generally easier, performances on false belief and
interpretive diversity tasks were related both on an in-
dividual basis and in terms of overall scores. In fact,
children with autism performed more consistently
across tasks than did children with delay in the fol-
lowing four ways: (1) overall scores for understanding
of false belief and interpretive diversity were signifi-
cantly associated, (2) performances across all three in-
terpretive diversity tasks were significantly correlated,
(3) performances on all five tasks were significantly
correlated, and (4) performances were significantly cor-
related across the Sally-Ann and Smarties false belief
tasks. These consistencies—but not the near-significant
difference between overall performances on false be-
lief and interpretive diversity tasks—seem to be in line
with the prediction we offered on behalf of the mod-
ular theory: namely, that children with autism would
perform similarly on tasks that make the same metarep-
resentational demands. How might this contradiction
be reconciled?
One way to make sense of these results is to rec-
ognize a number of subgroups within the autism sam-
ple. In the first subgroup, children with autism failed all
of the tasks, regardless of whether they were false be-
lief or interpretive diversity. This group’s performance,
then, seems consistent with the hypothesis that some
children with autism might fail all of the tasks presented
due to an absolute impairment in metarepresentational
capacity. In a second subgroup, children with autism
succeeded on all of the tasks presented, again regard-
less of whether they were interpretive diversity or false
belief. This subgroup may have achieved sufficient
metarepresentational ability to pass all of the first-order
tasks we gave them (although not necessarily, of course,
to succeed on second-order tasks that we did not give
them). Third, however, there was a smaller subgroup,
responsible for the near-significant difference between
overall false belief and interpretive diversity task per-
formance, who passed tasks of the former kind but failed
on the latter. In no instance did a child with autism suc-
ceed in any of the three interpretive diversity tasks if he
or she failed either of the false beliefs. How might we
account for performance by this last subgroup if not by
reference to metarepresentational capacity?
The idea that some children with autism may
“hack out” unconventional routes to solving false be-
lief tasks is now commonplace within the literature con-
cerned with social understanding in able individuals
with autism (e.g., Bowler, 1992; Frith, Morton, &
Leslie, 1991; Happe, 1995; Leslie & Roth, 1993; Leslie
& Thaiss, 1992). The “hacking” hypothesis has been
put forth largely to account for the finding that chil-
dren with autism who pass false belief tasks do not al-
ways show a corresponding understanding in everyday
situations. Persistent difficulties with everyday social
understanding suggest that the competence that enables
such children with autism to pass false belief tasks does
not always extend to the classroom or playground
(Frith, Happe, & Siddons, 1994; Hadwin et al., 1996;
Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). Although no direct evidence
exists concerning the methods that might be used by
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children in this subgroup, the high language skills that
frequently accompany success on false belief tasks by
children with autism have led to speculation that some
autistic children may use a language-based approach to
solving false belief paradigms (e.g., Tager-Flusberg &
Sullivan, 1994). In support of an “artificial” and rule-
based approach to social situations in autism are the
first-hand reports from high-functioning adults on the
Spectrum, which commonly report a need for “reason-
ing out” aspects of human relations to which the rest
of us seem intuitively “tuned in” (e.g., Sacks, 1995;
Williams, 1994). These individuals frequently report
the need to take an explicitly rule-based approach to
coping with even the more superficial features of so-
cial engagement. In perhaps the most striking illustra-
tion, Segar (1997) offers that the single most important
feature separating individuals with autism from those
without is the need for “autistic people to understand
scientifically what non-autistic people already under-
stand instinctively” (p. 24). Unfortunately, however,
the efficacy of this kind of “scientific” approach to so-
cial interaction may often be compromised by the poor
generalization skills so commonly observed by profes-
sionals concerned with pedagogy for children in this
clinical group. It is this lack of generalizing ability that
may explain the finding that some children succeed in
only a narrow range of tasks, without wider applica-
tion to either real-life situations, or in tasks of subtly
different kinds.
Unfortunately, without data regarding social un-
derstanding in more naturalistic settings, we cannot be
certain whether the more able children with autism in
our sample were showing a genuine understanding
about minds or were simply demonstrating effective
strategies for success on formal tasks of one or both
kinds. However, it may be that certain qualitative dif-
ferences between responses offered by autistic and
comparison groups offer some clue with regard to this
question. More specifically, responses given by the
children with autism on all tasks were nearly always
brief and “to the point,” without embellishment or qual-
ification until this was asked for. In contrast, answers
to test questions given by the delayed group were fre-
quently imaginative and often contained elements of
narrative in their explanations. For example, when
asked which interpretation another child might choose
of Jastrow’s duck/rabbit picture, responses included “a
monster with horns” and “I’ve got a rabbit at home.”
At the same time, children’s justifications of both cor-
rect and incorrect responses referred to what appeared
to be irrelevant facts or events, such as, “because I was
outside” or “she’s playing hide and seek.” Responses
of this nature evoke the interpretive approach to social
scenarios espoused by Nelson, Henesler, and Plesa
(1998). On this account, seemingly bizarre answers
may make sense when considered within the context of
children’s references to their prior experiences. This is
because, according to Nelson et al., children do not nor-
mally approach social situations by applying a rule-
based theory as some have suggested (Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995) but rather interpret each individual
situation by responding to features that have increased
salience due to prior experience.
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that
procedural bias might have contributed to the poor con-
sistency shown across tasks by the comparison group.
But exactly why these biases should have affected the
different groups differently is not readily apparent. The
same problem does not beleaguer an interpretive ac-
count of the kind offered by Nelson et al., because it
presupposes that responses will vary radically between
individuals according to personal experience. In par-
ticular, the idea that children in the comparison group
may have taken an intuitive approach to tasks presented
may help to explain the otherwise unaccountably low
correlation found between false belief tasks in the de-
layed group. During the past 15 years, the Smarties and
Sally-Ann tasks have become two of the most estab-
lished research instruments in theory of mind research
(although this is not the first time that reliability across
these tasks has been reported to be less than good
[Charman & Campbell, 1997]). Yet, in the case of pre-
sent findings relating to the delayed group, choosing
between these tasks as a canonical measure of false be-
lief understanding essentially determines whether this
was distinct from an appreciation of interpretive di-
versity. On the interpretive account offered by Nelson
et al., answers to these two tasks may have been dri-
ven more by experiential knowledge—for example,
about hide-and-seek games or the urgency of making
good someone else’s deceptive act—than by attention
to a common denominator concerning misrepresenta-
tion. If making sense of a given situation occurs via ne-
gotiation rather than via the tenets of a theory, then
responses are bound to differ between situations that
those of us initiated into the causal relations of theory
of mind concepts consider to be of the same kind.
Interestingly, it appears that it was the Sally-Ann
task that bore a large part of the responsibility for low
intertask correlations found among performances by
children in the cognitive delay group. In contrast, per-
formances by this group on the Smarties task were
found to correlate highly with all three interpretive di-
versity tasks. In particular, the especially high correla-
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tion found between performances by the delayed group
on the Smarties and Cow tasks might suggest that chil-
dren in this group found these tasks somewhat compa-
rable in the demands they made—perhaps due in part
to the efforts we made in equating their designs. On
this point, it seems feasible that children in the delayed
group may have succeeded on the Cow task without
genuinely understanding the mind as active interpreter.
Instead, it may have been sufficient for participants to
infer from their own experience (in accordance with
the “seeing-leads-to-knowing” principle) that if their
classmate had not seen the transparency containing the
outline, he or she might not know that the picture was
of a cow. In this way, participants in the delayed group
may have bypassed the need to appreciate that differ-
ent people might offer alternative interpretations of a
stimulus that remained unaltered in itself. On the other
hand, the fact that the Smarties and Cow tasks corre-
lated with both the Duck /Rabbit and Giraffe tasks—
but not with the Sally-Ann task—seems to suggest that
performance on the Smarties task more closely resem-
bled an interpretive diversity task than did the Cow task
a false belief.
Unfortunately, the present findings cannot shed
further light on this question, nor can they reveal the
method by which a subsection of children with autism
managed to pass the false belief tasks but fail on in-
terpretive diversity. The absence of significant corre-
lation between this profile and level 1 performance on
Taylor’s (1988) Giraffe task does not support the
hypothesis that children in this subgroup may have been
using a principle of “seeing-leads-to-knowing.” Rather,
it may be that interpretive diversity and false belief
tasks differed in some other property, which one hopes
to identify through future research.
To summarize, it seems that the higher consistency,
unembellished response format, and higher verbal com-
prehension ability that characterized successful perfor-
mance by children with autism may be in accord with
a less-intuitive, more rule-based approach to tasks than
that used by children with cognitive delay. In explain-
ing our results, we have made reference to two theoret-
ical viewpoints: the modular account of theory of mind
difficulties in autism proposed by Leslie and colleagues
(e.g., Roth & Leslie, 1998) and the interpretive approach
to theory of mind development in nonautistic individu-
als offered by Nelson et al. (1998). As Astington and
Olson (1995) suggest, accounts of both cognitive and
interpretive kinds have an important role to play in char-
acterizing the development of social understanding. Un-
fortunately, in the case of autism, the role that atypical
sociocultural development may play in poor under-
standing about minds has been almost entirely neglected
in favor of a focus on the mechanics of underlying cog-
nitive deficits. Whether processes that permit causal the-
ories about mind and behavior follow interpretation, or
vice versa, may never be resolved, but it seems likely
that where a clinical group is impaired in one, it will
also present with difficulties in the other. In reporting
the findings from a study that looked at narrative abil-
ity in high-functioning children with autism, Loveland
et al. (1990) wrote that, “The ‘social deficit’ of autism
is not limited to an impaired understanding of other peo-
ple’s thoughts and feelings: rather, a human cultural
perspective seems also to be lacking” ( p. 20). One such
perspective may correspond with a tendency to take an
interpretive approach to social situations.
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